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PROXIMATE CAUSE: MUST AN INTERVENING FORCE
BE FORESEEABLE?
Mozer v. Semenza, 177 So. 2d 880 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965)
Defendant owned and operated a hotel in which there was an unenclosed stairwell. He had been warned by a city fire inspector that
this stairwell constituted a hazardous condition because the draft it
created would cause a fire to spread rapidly. Defendant failed to correct the faulty condition. Subsequently, the hotel was set on fire
by an arsonist. The plaintiffs, guests in the hotel, were burned and
seriously injured while running from the fire. They brought suit
against the hotelkeeper for injuries sustained. Judgment was for
plaintiffs in the trial court. On appeal, HELD, the defendant's
negligence was a proximate cause of the injury despite the intervening
act of the arsonist. As long as the general risk of fire was foreseeable,
it was irrelevant whether the intervening force was foreseeable or
not. Judgment affirmed.
It has long been a principle of tort law that in order to establish
liability in negligence cases it must be proved that defendant's breach
of duty was the "proximate cause" of plaintiff's injury as well as the
"cause in fact.''' This broad principle has been generally accepted by
the Florida courts. 2 However, since proximate cause is essentially a
matter of court policy involving more than a factual determination of
3
causation, there is a great amount of diversity in the reports.
The question of proximate cause is frequently raised when, as in
Semenza, a third force intervenes between the defendant's negligence
and the resulting injury. "Intervening force" is defined by the Restatement of Torts as "one which actively operates in producing
harm to another after the actor's negligent act or omission has been
committed." 4 Intervening force is relevant because such a force may
relieve the originally negligent actor of liability. The extent of relief
from liability is frequently resolved in terms of foreseeability, the
general rule being that unless the intervening force is reasonably fore1. PROSSER, ToRTs 282 (3d ed. 1964); 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY
110 (1906); McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REv. 155-56 (1925).
2. E.g., Cone v. Inter County Tel. 8: Tel. Co., 40 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1949); Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Jones, 138 Fla. 746, 190 So. 26 (1939); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Mullin, 70 Fla. 450, 70 So. 467 (1915).
3. This diversity is candidly recognized, and perhaps exaggerated in Semenza
at 883: "It is notorious that proximate cause is in most cases what the courts will
it to be and that it is at best a theory under which the courts justify liability or
shield from liability those that the courts find should not in reason and logic be
responsible for a given result."
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §441 (1965).
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seeable the original actor is not liable. 5 When the Florida courts find
an intervening force unforeseeable and relieve the originally negligent
defendant from liability they refer to the intervening force as an
"independent efficient cause." 6
The Semenza case involves a type of factual situation in which it
is hard to absolve the first actor even though .the intervening force
was unforeseeable; in this situation the intervening force was unforeseeable, but the particular harm was foreseeable. For purposes of
brevity, this will be referred to as the "unforeseeable force - foreseeable harm" situation. In Semenza, for example, the arsonist was an unforeseeable intervening force but the particular harm that occurred, a
quickly spreading fire, was that threatened by defendant's negligence,
and thus foreseeable.
The courts have handled the "unforeseeable force -foreseeable
harm" situation in a variety of ways that do not always fit into the
neat patterns set out in the treatises and hornbooks.
Many courts have strictly followed the foreseeability test and have
found no liability when the intervening force was not foreseeable,
even though the harm that resulted was that threatened by defendant's negligence.7 Courts are even more likely to take this position
when the intervening force is criminal.8 Florida has, in the past, generally followed this line of cases whether the intervening act was
criminal or not.6
Other courts have felt that defendant should not be excused from
liability in the "unforeseeable force - foreseeable harm" situation.
However, these courts have used different approaches in justifying a
finding of liability. Some of these approaches unnecessarily add to
the confusion of proximate cause.
Some courts finding liability adhere, in their language, to the traditional rule that the intervening force must be foreseeable. However, when an "unforeseeable force - foreseeable harm" situation pre5. See the great number of cases from many jurisdictions collected by

PROSSER,

TORTS 310-26 (Sd ed. 1964).

6. E.g., Rawls v. Ziegler, 107 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1958); Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v.
Ponds, 156 So. 2d 781 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); Lingefelt v. Harmer, 125 So. 2d 325
(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960); Pope v. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., 120 So. 2d 227 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. 1960), cert. denied, 127 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1961).
7. E.g., Millirons v. Blue, 48 Ga. App. 483, 173 S.E. 443 (1934); Indiana Serv.
Corp. v. Johnston, 109 Ind. App. 204, 34 N.E.2d 157 (19&t); Chancey v. Norfolk
& W. Ry., 174 N.C. 351, 93 S.E. 834 (1917).
8. See Seith v. Commonwealth Elec. Co., 241 Ill. 252, 89 N.E. 425 (1909);
Klaman v. Hitchcock, 181 Minn. 109, 231 N.W. 716 (1930); Miller v. Bahmmuller,
124 App. Div. 558, 108 N.Y. Supp. 924 (1908).
9. See Mahr v. General Tel. Co., 163 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1964); Rawls v. Ziegler,
107 So. 2d 601 (1958); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Jones, 138 Fla. 749, 190 So. 26 (1939);
Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Ponds, 156 So. 2d 781 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
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sents itself, and the court wants to uphold the jury's finding of liability, it merely stretches foreseeability and holds the intervening force
foreseeable. 10 In one extreme case, 1 with facts somewhat similar to
those in Semenza, the intervening act of an arsonist was declared
foreseeable in order to hold the originally negligent defendant liable.
These cases appear undesirable because they apply one test of foreseeability to the intervening force when the harm is not foreseeable
and a different test when the harm is foreseeable.
Other courts find liability by labeling the original negligence a
cause "concurrent" with the intervening force, even though the second
force came after, and was not set in motion by, the original negli13
gence.' 2 Florida courts have followed this reasoning in several cases.

These cases cause confusion by applying the label "concurrent force"
14
to what is generally considered to be an intervening force.
A final way in which some courts have found liability in the
"unforeseeable force - foreseeable harm" cases is more straightforward;
these courts have simply declared that there will be liability if the
harm is foreseeable whether or not the intervening force was foreseeable. 15 This approach was taken in a leading federal case'6 in
which the defendant negligently failed to clean explosive gas from an
open barge. The gas was later ignited by lightning, an unforeseeable
intervening force. Defendant was held liable because the harm, an
explosion, was a foreseeable result of his negligence. This was the
direct approach used by the Third District Court of Appeal in the
Semenza case. The court clearly stated that as long as the risk of
harm was foreseeable due to defendant's negligence "it is not important to the liability of the [defendant] whether the fire started in
one way or another."' 7 Mahr v. General Telephone Co.,18 decided before Semenza, indicated that the majority of the Florida Supreme
10, See Ferrogiaro v. Bowline, 153 Cal. App. 2d 759, 315 P.2d 446 (1957);
Matthews v. Porter, 239 S.C. 620, 124 S.E.2d 321 (1962); Schafer & Olson v. Varney,
191 Wis. 186, 210 N.W. 359 (1926).
11. Torrack v. Corpamerica, 51 Del. 254, 144 A.2d 703 (1958).
12. See Russell v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 466, 305 P.2d 740 (1956);
Wilson v. Scurlock Oil Co., 126 So. 2d 429 (La. Ct. App. 1960); Brown v. Nat'l
Oil Co., 233 S.C. 345, 105 S.E.2d 81 (1958).
13. See Starling v. City of Gainesville, 90 Fla. 613, 106 So. 425 (1925); Town
of De Funiak Springs v. Perdue, 69 Fla. 326, 68 So. 234 (1915).

14. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

TORTs

§441 (1965).

15. See Gibson v. Garcia, 96 Cal. App. 2d 681, 216 P.2d 119 (1950); United
Novelty Co. v. Daniels, 42 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1949); Riley v. Standard Oil Co., 214
Wis. 15,252 N.W. 183 (1934).
16. Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64 F.2d 193 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933).
17. Mozer v. Semenza, 177 So. 2d 880, 883 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
18. 163 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1964).
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Court was not ready to accept the "foreseeable harm" doctrine. However, three justices dissented and indicated support for the "foreseeable harm" doctrine, while citing with approval the leading federal case mentioned above. Mahr was not considered in the Semenza
opinion.
The rationale of the foreseeable harm theory is that the defendant's negligence that threatens a particular harm should not be excused just because the harm is brought about through an unforeseeable intervening force. The hotelkeeper in Semenza was negligent
in not remedying a dangerous condition that he was warned to fix.
Granted that the fire was started by an unforeseeable intervening
force, still it was probably the hotelkeeper's negligence that caused
the building to burn rapidly enough to injure the guests. Since the
harm was foreseeable, why should defendant be absolved simply because the manner in which the fire started was unforeseeable? If
defendant had not been negligent the plaintiffs might well have had
time to escape unharmed. This is not to say that defendant should be
liable when both the intervening force and the harm are unforeseeable. The Third District Court, which decided Semenza, holds no
liability when both are unforeseeable.19
Another consideration in Semenza was the fact that the intervening
force was a criminal one. It might be argued that the originally negligent defendant, being less culpable than the criminal, should be absolved of liability. Many courts do shift the responsibility to the
criminal, 20 but what if the criminal is not apprehended or, more
likely, is insolvent? Then, if the original defendant is not held liable,
the burden is being left upon the innocent plaintiff. It is not being
shifted to the criminal. As between innocent plaintiff and negligent
defendant, certainly defendant is more culpable. It would appear,
then, that the better rule would be to hold defendant liable even if
the intervening force is a criminal one. If the criminal is found and
is solvent, negligent defendant should be able to get reimbursement
from him, since Florida courts recognize the principle of indemnity.21
If the criminal is not found or is not solvent, the negligent defendant
should not complain about having to bear the loss because, after all,
he is more at fault than the injured plaintiff.

19. Lingefelt v. Hanner, 125 So. 325 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
20. See cases cited note 8 supra.
21. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla.
330, 143 So. 316 (1932). No cases have been found that either apply or reject
indemnity in a Florida case similar to Semenza. However, it is only when the
courts find liability that they can apply the indemnity principle.
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Semenza, by adopting the "foreseeable harm" test, follows the
general trend toward increased tort liability. In applying this test
even when the unforeseeable intervening force was a criminal one,
the Third District Court of Appeal appears to have gone further
than other Florida courts and the courts of many other jurisdictions.
However, Semenza should be considered sound law by those who
think it basically unfair to let defendant escape liability for the predictable results of his negligence.
WILLIAM
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